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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on institutions and economic growth by conducting an empirical 
examination on the links between innovation and institutions. Using cross-country data and the instrumental 
variable method, this study finds that institutional arrangements explain much of the variation on patent 
production across countries. We find evidence that control of corruption, market-friendly policies, protection 
of property rights and a more effective judiciary system boost an economy‟s rate of innovation. Most of the 
previous literature on institutional and economic performance finds a positive association between institutions 
and levels of income and between institutions and the transitional growth rates of per capita income; however 
an unambiguous empirical association between institutions and the steady state growth has not yet been 
established. Based on the theoretical model developed by Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006), which shows that the 
impacts of institutions on innovation spillover to the growth rate of GDP per capita, this paper shows 
evidence of a growth effect through innovation, i.e., institutions have a growth effect on income because 
institutional quality affects an economy‟s rate of innovation, the engine of economic growth. Moreover, this 
study finds that controlling for institutional quality; geographic-related variables are not significant in 
explaining patent production. This paper also finds evidence to support the idea that in the long-run human 
capital accumulation is an important variable in shaping institutions. 
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Do Institutions Impact Innovation?   
 
1. Introduction 
A fundamental challenge for the economics profession lies in explaining the mechanisms of 
economic growth. There is little doubt that significant progress has been made during the last five decades 
in growth modeling and economists‟ understanding of the mechanisms of economic growth. It also 
appears that economists have reached a consensus on the notion that long-run economic growth is 
primarily a product of technical innovation. However, there is still much to learn about the factors that 
ultimately determine a country‟s rate of innovation. Fundamentally, growth economists are still struggling 
to understand the linkages between institutional quality and innovation and to incorporate institutions into 
the standard theoretical framework of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Huang and Xu, 1999). The 
publication of the breakthrough paper of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and the availability of datasets on 
institutional quality
1
 greatly contributed to the opening of a new front for empirical research aimed at 
evaluating the influences of institutional-related variables on economic performance [levels and growth 
rates of output per capita] (e.g. Barro, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001 and 2004; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Alcala and 
Ciccone, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Most of the previous literature on institutional and economic 
performance finds a positive association between institutions and levels of income (e. g Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001 and 2004; Alcala and Ciccone, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003) and between 
institutions and the transitional growth rates of per capita income (e.g. Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995). 
However, an unambiguous empirical association between institutions and the steady state growth has not 
yet been established and the question whether institutions affect the steady-state growth rate of income is 
still open. In addition, very little has been done in terms of evaluating empirically the influences of 
institutional quality on technical innovation. This study contributes to this literature by examining 
empirically the links between technical innovation and the quality of institutional arrangements.  
                                                 
1
 For example, datasets from Gastil (1979), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Transparency 
International (TI), Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) are 
now available. 
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This paper develops an econometric model for technical innovation derived from a theoretical 
model developed in Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006), which gives simple testable predictions regarding the 
mechanism by which institutions
2
 influence technical innovation. Specifically, we test the prediction that 
institutions boost technical innovation (patent production) and also examine how different kinds of 
institutions (Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation) affect the 
production of patents. The empirical strategy used to assess the questions posed above is derived from 
Figure 1, which presupposes that early institutions are associated with the colonization process, geography 
and early accumulated human capital; and the interaction of these factors determine current institutions 
(Rule of law, Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality and the Risk of Expropriation). Furthermore, 
current institutions affect technical innovation (measured by patent production), which ultimately affects a 
country‟s economic performance. The econometric analysis conducted in this paper consists of estimating 
OLS and instrumental variable (IV) cross-country regressions, where the dependent variable is the number 
of patents (a measure of innovation). 
Figure 1: Institutions and Economic Growth 
Colonization
Geography
Human Capital
Early Institutions
Current Institutions
Innovation
(patent production)
Economic Growth
 
This paper provides evidence that control of corruption, market-friendly policies, protection of 
property rights and a more effective judiciary system boost an economy‟s rate of innovation. In addition, it 
                                                 
2
  This study follows Sala-i-Martin (2002) and the word institutions (or institutional arrangements) refers to a 
hypothetical variable that accounts for: 
i) Law enforcement: enforcement of property rights, existence of a working legal system and the independence 
of the judiciary system; 
ii) Political institutions: democracy, political stability, public representatives chosen by vote and the existence of 
class organizations;  
iii) Market structure: economic freedom, anti-trust regulations, openness to international trade, modern bank 
system, working credit system and organized stock and bond markets; 
iv) Transparency of the Public Administration: red tape, corruption and bureaucracy; 
v) Sociocultural context: religious practices, entrepreneurial spirit and social ties.  
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also shows a growth effect through innovation, i.e., institutions have a growth effect on income because 
institutional quality affects an economy‟s rate of innovation, the engine of economic growth. This paper 
also finds empirical evidence to support Lipset‟s (1960) theoretical arguments that in the long-run human 
capital accumulation is a key variable in shaping institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the intrinsic challenges in 
conducting empirical evaluation on institutions and outlines the difficulties in measuring innovation. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 evaluates the empirical model and discusses the estimates. Section 5 
summarizes the paper‟s findings.  
 
2.  Background 
It is standard procedure in the empirical growth literature to include institutions in growth 
regressions as an ordinary explanatory variable of steady state per capita output (e.g. Kormendi and 
Meguire, 1985; Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995 and 1997; Oliva and Rivera-Batiz, 
2002; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; Dollar and Kraay; 2003). This approach implicitly assumes that 
institutions affect the productivity of factors of production and implies that countries with better 
institutional arrangements will experience faster growth rates of per capita output. Despite the appeal of 
this argument, most of the empirical analyses report only weak evidence that better institutional 
arrangement leads to faster growth (see Levine and Renelt, 1992; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003). Moreover, 
there is a fundamental problem in this analysis. Regression analysis based on Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) cannot provide evidence that institutions affect long-run growth rates of the economy. The 
dependent variable (growth rates of output per capita) only accounts for the transitional dynamics of per 
capita income over a specific period of time and cannot be interpreted as steady state growth rate of per 
capita income. In other words, a statistically significant coefficient on an institutional measure supports 
the argument that institutions have a positive effect on transitional growth rates of output per capita, but 
one cannot jump to the conclusion that this implies steady-state growth effects.  
Furthermore, economists are increasingly aware that institutional arrangements affect knowledge 
accumulation (e.g. Rodrik, 2000; Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Gradstein, 2004) and consequently, institutional 
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arrangements affect the long-run growth of output. Therefore, if one wants not only to diagnose the 
problem of growth, but also search for ways to stimulate growth, it is very important to understand how 
institutions and innovation are linked. Few growth models explicitly address this issue (e.g. Huang and 
Xu, 1999; Fedderke, 2001; Gradstein, 2004; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2006) and no empirical cross-country 
analysis directly exploits such a link.  
 
2.1 An Empirical Model of Innovation 
The model developed by Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) suggests that changes in technology are 
associated with the quality of institutional arrangements. Specifically, a variable that accounts for 
institutional quality enters directly into the production function of new ideas, but not as a choice variable. 
Therefore, R&D firms make decisions on the demand for human capital taking institutions as given. 
Consider the equation:
3
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where A measures technical knowledge, HA is human capital engaged in R&D, and Z denotes the quality 
of the institutional structure, which depends on both the set of institutions in place (T) and the state-of-art 
technology.  
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1. Accordingly, the production function of new technologies is given by:  
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3
 This specification overlooks the influences of physical capital on knowledge production. The rationale supporting 
this formulation is the idea that knowledge production is more human capital intensive. 
 
4
 Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) provide the rationale for this specification/argument.   
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The logic behind this formulation is that institutions are a necessary input for the production of 
new R&D projects. Good institutions help in the process of registering new patents, diffusion of ideas 
across researchers, diffusion of current knowledge, enforcement of property rights and reduce the 
uncertainty of new projects; all factors that stimulate R&D activities. Therefore, in this theoretical 
formulation, ceteris paribus, good institutions are expected to impact positively in the rate of technical 
innovation. In addition, the model developed by Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) also shows that the impact of 
institutions on innovation spillovers to income such that, at the steady state, the growth rate of output 
increases as the institutional quality improves. More specifically, the model implies that in the steady state 
the growth rate of GDP per capita is equal to the growth rate of technology. Therefore, from a theoretical 
standpoint, showing that institutions impact the rate of innovation implies that institutions impact the 
growth rate of GDP per capita.  
Although equation (1) intuitively associates changes in technology to institutional arrangements, it 
is a nonlinear differential equation and cannot be directly estimated. One can overcome this obstacle by 
rewriting it as a discrete equation: 
  
aa1
1t1ttt THAAAA 1At

    (1A) 
Equation 1A can be transformed to linearity by taking logarithms of both sides. Adding an error 
term and reparametrizing the model generates:  
  tiititAiti TAHA ,31,21,10,
ˆ)ln()ln()ln(     (2) 
where t represents time, i indexes observations, Tˆ  denotes the logarithmic transformation of T and v is 
random disturbance. This empirical equation is specified in terms of Tˆ  rather than ln(T) because i) this 
study uses standardized measures of institutions, which have zero mean and assume negative values, 
preventing the use of logarithmic transformations and ii) the true measure of institutions is not known, so 
Tˆ  is used as a proxy for ln(T).5 This procedure has become standard in the literature (e.g. Dollar and 
Kraay, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999). Despite the apparent 
                                                 
5
 See the next section for a detailed discussion about measurement error in T and the econometric strategy used to 
address this problem.  
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simplicity of equation 2, its estimation is difficult due to endogeneity and the difficulties in measuring A 
and T.  
i) Measuring Institutions and Innovation  
We follow a growing branch of the growth literature that suggests that subjective institutional 
measures provide relevant information about growth-promoting institutional arrangements and thus can be 
used as proxies for institutions (e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Mauro, 1995; Moers, 1999; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 
2005a and 2005b). Specifically, this study uses four subjective measures of institutions: i) Rule of Law, ii) 
Control of Corruption, iii) Regulatory Quality and iv) Risk of Expropriation. Section 3 provides more 
details about these variables.  
There is no problem incorporating technical innovation into theoretical economic models. 
However, there are serious limitations to most methods aimed at developing a proxy for quantifying 
innovation. In fact, difficulties in finding an empirical counterpart for technical innovation have limited 
empirical studies on technical innovation and economic performance (Romer, 2002). Albeit imperfect, we 
develop a proxy for innovation using the sum of patents registered over a specific period. This approach 
follows recent studies that suggest that one can use “patents to create systematic measures of intangibles 
[innovation/knowledge] that drive economic growth” (Romer, 2002: ix, Foreword). 
Schmookler (1966), Griliches (1979) and Griliches (1984) are the pioneers in using patent count 
as a measure of innovation. These authors also provide the foundations for the specification of a 
production function of knowledge as a function of R&D expenditure and the existing stock of knowledge. 
These contributions have opened a new and promising front for research, allowing researchers to use 
“patent data to get an empirical handle on quantifying the „importance‟ or „value‟ of innovations, 
measuring flows of technological knowledge and characterizing the technological development and 
impact of particular institutions and countries” (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002:2). 
Three main concerns regards the reliability of patent count as a measure of innovation can be 
raised: i) not all inventions are patented because some do not meet certain criteria necessary for an 
invention to be patentable, even though they increase the stock of knowledge; ii) patentable innovations 
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may not be patented because economic agents may strategically “rely on secrecy or other means of 
appropriability” (Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002: 4) and iii) not all patents have the same quality. If the first 
and second limitations were present, the use of patents would underestimate the actual production of 
knowledge/innovation. In addition, the second problem may be aggravated in countries with poor 
protection of private property rights and fragile legal systems. In this case, it may be optimal for 
innovators to choose to rely on secrecy to protect their inventions. However, “it is widely believed that 
these limitations [i and ii] are not too severe, but that remains an open empirical issue” (Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2002: 56). In addition, one could invoke the „law of large number” and argue that the third 
limitation will not play any role given a significantly large sample size (Griliches, 1990). Despite these 
and other
6
 well known drawbacks the use of patent counts to measure innovation [or change in the stock 
of knowledge] is now widely supported (e.g. Griliches, 1979, 1990 and 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Paul Romer, 2002; and Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). According to Griliches (1990), “[I]n spite of all the 
difficulties, patents statistics remain a unique resource for the analysis of the process of technical change” 
(Griliches, 1990:1702). This study follows this approach and uses patent counts as a measure for 
innovation. Specifically, the accumulated number of patents granted over a period is utilized as a proxy 
for knowledge production/innovation, that is: 
Ti
T
t
tiiTiTi PpAAA ,
0
,0,,,  

 
where p denotes the number of patents granted to country i and t indexes time. 
Substituting the equation above into equation (2) generates: 
TiiiAiTi TAHP ,30,20,10,
ˆ)ln()ln()ln(    (3) 
It is worth noticing that equation 3 differs from the empirical specification of previous studies that 
estimate a production function for patents. For instance, Griliches (1990) and Jaffe and Lerner (2002) 
specify an equation for patents as a function of R&D expenditure by different economic agents 
(universities, firms and government) using the previous production of patents as a proxy for existing stock 
                                                 
6
 In addition to the problems discussed above, the reliability of the proxy for innovation based on sum of patents also 
depends on i) the cross-country similarly in standards to register a patent; ii) measurement precision, and iii) target of 
the market.   
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of knowledge. The use of personnel engaged in R&D instead of R&D expenditure represents a change of 
the focus (from input costs to the input itself), but as shown by Griliches (1994), these variables are highly 
correlated and should contain comparable information about the production process. Moreover, equation 3 
is an expanded version of the Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) knowledge production functions. More 
precisely, it highlights the significant role that institutional arrangements have in the process of knowledge 
production.  
ii) Measuring the Stock of Knowledge  
Sedgley (2005) proposes to estimate the initial stock of knowledge by utilizing the ratio of total 
patents issued during a specific period over the growth of the number of volumes in the collection of the 
national library during the same period. Sedgley (2005) applies this method to conduct a time-series 
evaluation of innovation in the U.S. However, data limitation prevents the use of this procedure here. 
Moreover, in this study the key role of the stock of knowledge (A) is to measure a country‟s share of 
world knowledge and determine its position on a hypothetical world knowledge frontier. So, this study 
utilizes two alternative proxies for the initial stock of knowledge: patent flow in the initial period and a 
relative measure of book production.  The rational for using these proxies is discussed below. 
For simplicity‟s sake, it is useful to distinguish two kinds of knowledge: explicit knowledge and 
tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that can be easily systematized and stored in 
printed material or multimedia so that it can be easily transmitted across individuals and the scholarly 
community. Tacit knowledge is knowledge internalized by individuals and rooted in individual 
experience, personal beliefs, perspectives and values. This kind of knowledge is difficult to formalize and 
convert into media (words or models) that can be easily shared and understood by other individuals 
(Polanyi, 1966; Zoltan and Perner, 1999; Clark, 2004). 
While tacit knowledge can be very important at the firm level, since it may translate into 
competitive advantage (Laszlo and Laszlo, 2002), explicit knowledge, whether privately acquired and/or 
public knowledge, is the key force in the innovation process and also seems to be a closer parallel to the 
concept of knowledge found in the endogenous growth literature. For example, the idea that knowledge 
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production in a region may spillover into neighboring regions can only be supported if the new knowledge 
is made available to economic agents in neighboring areas.  
Because there are a variety of modes for communicating and exchanging knowledge across 
individuals, such as books, reference material, television, internet, etc., there exist several difficulties in 
moving from a theoretical definition of knowledge to a quantitative measure of knowledge even if we 
restrict our attention to explicit knowledge. However, it seems plausible to assume that much of the 
explicit knowledge available to a society is contained in its literary production. As a result of the book 
production revolution in the middle of the fifteenth century, a “much greater proportion of the population 
has the chance to acquire education, culture and information” (Kipphan, 2001:5). Moreover, Cochran 
(2001) argues that the “epoch of printing … transmuted and magnified the inscribing powers of writing, 
creating previously unimaginable possibilities to organize and institutionalize secular knowledge” 
(Cochran, 2001: 3, emphasis added). 
These arguments support the idea that the stock of knowledge can be proxied by the country‟s 
share of world book production (new titles). The logic behind this formulation is that a significant share of 
a society‟s knowledge is transmitted across individuals and from generation to generation through books, 
so that a highly knowledgeable society is expected to produce a large number of book titles and 
consequently should have a larger share of world book production. So, a country‟s share of world book 
production is used as a proxy for the starting stock of knowledge (concrete measure of the current 
knowledge stock) in the regression analysis. For robustness purposes, we use two measures: the share of 
applied and pure sciences book production, and the share of all new titles. In addition, we also use the 
initial flow of patents to approximate the stock of knowledge.  
 
iii) Endogeneity  
Another problem in estimating equation 3 is the potential endogeneity of the right-hand variables. 
In a cross-section of countries one can address the issue by using the initial values of H and A, which are 
predetermined and uncorrelated with the error term. However, T is measured contemporaneously and is 
likely to be endogenous. This undermines the reliability of estimates obtained by Ordinary Least Squares 
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(OLS). To eliminate this problem, a set of instruments for institutions, which needs to be correlated with 
current institutions but uncorrelated with innovation should be used.  
The empirical literature on institutions suggests that much of the variation in current institutions 
can be explained by geography-related variables and historically determined factors such as colonial status 
and origin of the legal system (Hall and Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Following this approach, current 
institutions are modeled as follows:  
iiiii RGHT   33,021
ˆ  (4) 
where Tˆ denotes institutions, 0H denotes the initial endowment of human capital, G is a vector of 
geographical variables, R is a vector of “other” exogenous determinants of institutions (e.g., colonial 
status or legal origin) and  is a vector of random disturbances.  
Equation 4 is very similar to the empirical specification for institutions found in La Porta et al. 
(1999), McArthur and Sachs (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004). However, this study proposes 
to add previously accumulated human capital as a determinant of current institutions. More specifically, 
this equation states that the initial level of human capital is an important input in the shaping of early 
institutional arrangements.
7
  
 Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004) argue that early institutions were affected by geography because 
the colonization process endogenously responded to certain environmental conditions, creating institutions 
specific to the colony‟s geography. Specifically, colonies characterized by a heavy burden of infectious 
disease (e.g. malaria and yellow fever) discouraged the formation of European-type settlements. In these 
non-settler colonies “… colonial powers set up ´extractive states´…. These institutions did not introduce 
much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government 
expropriation” (Acemoglu et al., 2001:1370). On the other hand, geographically advantaged settlement 
colonies were relatively free to engage in processes that replicated in some way European social 
                                                 
7
 This proposition is motivated by the work of Bernard Mandeville (early 1700), who argues that the development of 
institutions is an evolutionary process depending on generations of accumulated knowledge (Rosenberg, 1963). In 
addition, a recent article by Glaeser at al. (2004) also shows that human capital positively impacts institutions, “even 
over a relatively short horizon of 5 years” (p. 296).  
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arrangements, which ultimately helped to develop better institutions and generate a system that protected 
private property rights in these colonies (Denoon, 1983; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Denoon (1983) argues 
that many settler colonies (e.g. US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) had representative institutions 
during the colonial period and that those institutions constituted the basis of the modern institutions that 
emerged in those countries. Engerman and Sokoloff (2003), Gallup et al., (1999) and Sachs (2000) also 
support the view that adverse geography negatively affects the development of growth-promoting 
institutions.  
It has also been argued that the historically predetermined origin of the legal system may have had 
a very important role in determining a country‟s current institutional arrangements, that is, “[a] civil legal 
tradition, then, can be taken as a proxy for an intent to build institutions to further the power of the State” 
(La Porta et al., 1999:.232). The different civil law systems were spread throughout “the world through 
conquest, colonization, imitation and voluntary adoption” (La Porta et al., 1999:231). La Porta et al. 
(1999) suggest categorizing the legal systems into 5 groups: common law (British), French civil law 
(France), German civil law (German), Scandinavian civil law (Scandinavia) and socialist law (Soviet 
Union). Each of these legal systems is based on a set of principles that demarcate the role of the 
government in protecting property rights, defining regulatory systems and instituting political freedom. 
For instance, from a theoretical viewpoint, countries whose legal systems are based on the common law 
tradition are expected to be less interventionist and favor political and economic freedom when compared 
to countries whose legal system is based on one of the other legal traditions. Countries with socialist laws 
tend to have protectionist governments and limited political freedom (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Therefore, equations 3 and 4 form a system of equations - where T and P are endogenous - that 
links patent production (innovation) to institutions. This specification implies that the origin of the legal 
system, geographically related variables and the initial human capital endowment determine current 
institutions, but are uncorrelated with current production of patents (innovation). This setup may be 
contentious because one could argue that these variables are directly correlated with the production of 
patents even after controlling for institutions. This would imply that the system is not properly identified. 
However, it seems to be reasonable to presuppose that the colonial legacy directly influences current 
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institutions, but has no direct effect on current innovation (patent production), so the colonial legacy 
variables should not be correlated with equation 3‟s error term. In other words, the innovation effect from 
the colonial legacy is felt through the impact on current institutions rather than directly influencing current 
innovation. Additionally, as argued previously, the initial human capital endowment may have affected 
early institutions, which ultimately shaped current institutions. Because current innovation is a function of 
contemporary institutions this variable could have an indirect effect on current patent production via 
current institutions. Finally, geography-related variables may have a direct effect on current institutions as 
well as a direct effect on innovation. Because this is an empirical question, it is examined together with 
the estimation of the model. The concerns regarding the identification of the model constitute, in fact, an 
empirical issue that can be evaluated by testing if the instruments are correlated with the equation 3‟ error 
term. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2005a), this study uses the 
Hansen‟s J test to examine whether the variables listed above satisfy the requirements for valid 
instruments. 
 
3. Data and Measurement Error 
There are several cross-country measures of institutional quality available for conducting 
empirical research. The most common measures used in the growth and institutions literature include 
autocracy, government effectiveness, executive constraints, risk of expropriation, and (control of) 
corruption. However, many of these proxies for institutions are highly correlated (see La Porta et at., 
1999; Glaeser et al., 2004) and the choice of the institutional measure for conducting empirical work is, in 
general, ad hoc.   
This study uses four different measures of institutions. Three of these measures are from a dataset 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003), which covers 199 countries. Specifically, it utilizes an average 
index through the time periods 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 of Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and 
Regulatory Quality. These measures of institutions “are based on several hundred variables measuring 
perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different 
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organizations” (Kaufmann et al., 2003:3). The Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and Regulatory Quality 
variables range between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores indicating better institutional arrangements.
8
  
The fourth measure of institutional quality is a proxy for market institutions and measures the risk 
of confiscation and forced nationalization. This variable is used with the purpose to conform to other 
studies in the growth and institutions literature. It is calculated as the average value for each country over 
the period 1985-1995 and ranges between 0 and 10 with higher scores representing better institutions and 
thus lower risk of confiscation or forced nationalization. This variable is originally from Political Risk 
Services, but it was taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001).
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The data on patents is from the World Bank and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). The USPTO provides information about the numbers of patents granted to non-residents back 
to the 1970s, that is, inventions created in countries other than the U.S. whose inventors wish to patent 
their ideas in the US market. Non-resident patenting suggests that those inventions have some non-
negligible economic value and may embody a valuable contribution to the stock of knowledge. A proxy 
for innovation using USPTO data can be defined as follows: 
USPTO
t
USPTO
ii
USPTO
iiti
PpAAA  

2003
1970
1970,2003,  
                                                 
8Regulatory Quality “includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development” (Kaufmann et al., 2003:3). Rule of Law includes “several indicators which 
measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions 
of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and importantly, the extent to which property 
rights are protected” (Kaufmann et al., 2003:3). Control of Corruption “measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain…. The presence of corruption is often a 
manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted 
(typically a public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions and hence represents a failure of 
governance according to our definition” (Kaufmann et al., 2003:4).  
 
9
 Glaeser at al. (2004) argue that these measures of institutions (Risk of Expropriation, Control of Corruption, Rule 
of Law and Regulatory Quality (the last three are labeled as “government effectiveness”) are actually outcome 
measures rather than ´deep´ measures of institutions. While this argument is correct, that is, the institutional 
measures used in this paper are outcome measures, if this were not so; we would not be concerned about finding 
instruments for these measures (see Acemoglu et al. 2005a and 2005b for a detailed discussion on this issue).  
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where p denotes the number of patents granted to country i.
10
 
The World Bank makes available data on patents granted by each country‟s patent office to 
residents from 1995 to 2001. This data is used to generate another proxy for innovation between 1995 and 
2001.
11
 
WB
t
WB
ii
WB
iiti
PpAAA  

2001
1995
1995,2001,  
Despite the fact that patent counts greatly differ across these datasets; there is a 0.81 correlation 
between the natural logarithms of
WB
i
USPTO
i PandP  for the period 1995-2001 and a 0.79 correlation 
between these measures using all available data (USPTO: 1970-2003 and World Bank: 1995-2001). The 
model is estimated using both the USPTO and World Bank datasets. This necessitates running regressions 
for each dataset, which demands collecting data that match the time periods for which the statistics on 
patents are available. 
As previously discussed, equation 3 can be estimated only if an objective measure of the initial 
stock of knowledge is provided. This study uses the initial flow of patents and a share of book production 
to approximate the stock of knowledge. Data on book production are from several years of the UNESCO 
Statistical Yearbook and defined as the number of book titles produced (non-periodical publications) by 
each country. The statistics include book production in applied sciences, pure sciences, social sciences, 
philosophy, arts, geography, history and generalities. In a cross-section analysis such as the one 
undertaken in this study, the initial values play a key role in determining the parameter estimates. In order 
to minimize noise from a single year‟s data the calculations are made using the average number of books 
produced over a five year period. In a few cases, the statistics are not available for all five years during the 
time period considered and the average is calculated using the available information. Specifically, for the 
regressions using patent data from the USPTO, A0 is calculated as follows: 
                                                 
10
 This proxy for innovation may be biased against countries whose inventors do not target the U.S. market or due to 
high transaction costs due to distance for example, which may affect an inventor‟s decision to patent a new invention 
in the U.S. 
 
11
 This proxy for innovation may suffer from comparability issues due to cross-country dissimilarly in standards to 
register a patent; 
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where B denotes yearly book title production, i indexes countries, t indexes time and n denotes the number 
of years for which the data is available. This variable can be interpreted as the share of average yearly 
book production relative to book production in the United States. As previously discussed, this variable is 
intended to proxy the initial stock of knowledge. To conform to the availability of the patent data, this 
variable is measured over 1968 to 1972 and over 1995 to 1999. Moreover, two alternative measures are 
utilized: the share of all new titles produced and the share of applied and pure sciences book production. 
The second approximation of the stock of knowledge is built as follows:  



1963
1970t
i,t
p
i,o pA  
where p denotes the number of patents granted to country i and t indexes times.  
Figure 1 shows that the two measures of the initial stock of knowledge are highly correlated, so 
the model‟s estimates should not differ significantly when using either of these proxies.  In addition, the 
high correlation between the share of book production and the initial stock of patents also suggests that 
knowledgeable societies are more innovative. Therefore, our strategy of using the share of book 
production to proxy initial knowledge seems to be reasonable. 
Personnel engaged in R&D is measured as the total number of scientists, engineers, technicians 
and supporting staff engaged in research and development. The data on personnel is expressed as a full-
time equivalent. This variable is from several years of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. The data is not 
comprehensive in the sense that it does not provide a large cross-section of countries for the same year. In 
numerous cases, the statistics are available just for a few years during the time period considered. 
Averages over a five years period are utilized to maximize the sample size. Specifically,  
i
1972
1968t
i,ti,0A nLH 

  
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where L denotes labor force engaged in R&D, i indexes countries, t indexes time and n ≤ 5 denotes the 
number of years for which the data is available. This variable is measured over 1968 to 1972 and over 
1995 to 2001.  
The idea that the development of institutions is an evolutionary process depending on previously 
accumulated knowledge is accounted for in the empirical model by including a variable that measures 
human capital accumulation in the early 20
th
 century. This variable is calculated as the number of students 
in school in 1920 per square kilometer.  
ii,0i,0 areahH   
where 0h denotes the number of students in school in 1920, area  denotes the country land area and i 
indexes countries. 
Data on students enrolled in primary and secondary schools in early 20
th
 century is from Mitchell 
(2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Mitchell provides these statistics back to the eighteenth century only for a few 
countries. A representative cross-country sample can be only collected around 1920. Mitchell reports the 
number of children enrolled in primary and secondary schools for 68 countries in 1920 and statistics for 
52 countries around the 1930s. Therefore, combining the actual 1920 data with estimates of the number of 
students enrolled in 1920 based upon the 1930 numbers allows one to get a sample comprised of 120 
countries.
12
 The country area, which is needed to calculate the schooling density variable, is from the 
United Nations and based upon the current geopolitical arrangement. Countries that experienced changes 
in their boundaries, such as the former USSR republics, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, India, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Algeria and Zaire were not included in the regression analysis.
13
 
The geographic variables are taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) and La Porta et al. (1999). 
We use i) mean temperature, which measures the 1987 mean annual temperature in Celsius; ii) coastal 
land, which quantifies the proportion of land area within 100 km of the coast and iii) latitude, which 
                                                 
12
 We use the geometric growth rates in the estimations. For instance, if a country has data on enrollment between 
1930 and 1940, the geometric growth rate between these periods is utilized to estimate enrollment back to 1920.  
 
13
 In fact, these countries were not included in our analysis because of missing data or simply because they did not 
exist back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  
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quantifies the absolute value of the latitude, is scaled to take values between 0 and 1. This variable is taken 
from La Porta et al. (1999). 
The colonial legacy is measured by a set of dummy variables that identify the origin of a country‟s 
legal system. Specifically, these dummies identify if the origin of the legal system is English, French, 
German, Scandinavian, or Socialist. These variables were taken from La Porta et al. (1999).  
Measurement error  
Almost all economic variables are measured with error and this problem is augmented in this 
study due to the nature of the variables being studied. If an explanatory variable is measured with error, it 
is necessarily correlated with the error term. In the presence of measurement error OLS estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). According to Hall and Jones (1999), this 
problem can be addressed together with the endogeneity issue by using the IV estimator. Consider that 
institutions are measured with an error, such that: 
  iii TT 
ˆ  (5) 
where Tˆ  is unobserved institutions, T  is measured institutions and   is the measurement error. 
Substituting equation 5 into equation 3 gives: 
  tiiiiTi TAHP Ai ,330,210, )ln()ln()ln( 0,    (6) 
The explanatory variables from equation 3 and 4 can be stacked in matrices Z=[HA0  A0] and 
X=[H0  G  R] respectively. If X is a valid instrument for T , then E[X‟v]=0. Assuming that   is 
uncorrelated with v, Z and X; 3  is identified by the orthogonality conditions and both the measurement 
error and the endogeneity concerns are addressed. Therefore, it is crucial for the reliability of estimates to 
select variables to instrument institutions that are uncorrelated with the error term of the second-stage 
regressions.  
 
4 Regression Analysis 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables utilized in this study. The differences in the 
sample size reported in this table are the result of missing data. Table 2 and Figure 2 show that patent 
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production is strongly correlated with all four measures of institutions. We use regression analysis to test 
if the positive relationship between institutions and patent production holds as we account for other factors 
that influence patent production. Several alternative specifications and different methods of estimation are 
utilized to evaluate the robustness of the results. We follow Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004) and La Porta 
et al. (1999) and estimate equation 4 using OLS. Subsequently, equation 5 is estimated using OLS and the 
IV methods.
14
  
 
4.1 The Determinants of Institutions   
Despite the fact that appraising the determinants of institutions is not the primary goal of this 
study; our model of patent production requires finding suitable instruments for institutions. This 
necessitates at least some evaluation of the determinants of institutions.
15
 Our empirical strategy closely 
follows the literature by instrumenting institutions with legal origins (La Porta et al. 1999), geography 
(Acemoglu, 2001; Rodrik, 2000) and historical levels of human capital. Our estimates of the first stage 
regressions for the four measures of institutions considered in the paper conform to most of the results 
previously found in the literature.  
Tables 3 and 4 provide the estimates of equation 4 using the four different institutional measures. 
The adjusted R-squared indicates that over 60 percent of the variation in Control of Corruption and Rule 
of Law can be explained by the set of explanatory variables included in the estimates. The model explains 
about 50 percent of the variation in Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation. The overall fit of the 
model is in accordance with previous studies in the field (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004; La Porta et 
al.,1999). It is worth noticing that mean temperature and latitude are highly correlated (-0.85) and provide 
comparable information about climate conditions. Including these two variables simultaneously may cause 
severe multicollinearity but not improve the model‟s fit. The best parsimonious specification seems to 
include only mean temperature and the share of land in the coast as controls for geographic influences. 
                                                 
14
 We also estimated the model using the GMM estimator. The sizes of the GMM and 2SLS coefficients were very 
similar and the qualitative conclusions identical. The GMM estimates are not reported in the paper and can be 
provided upon request.  
 
15
 A detailed discussion of the determinants of institutions can be found in Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004), 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and La Porta et al. (1999). 
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To sum up, the estimates provide evidence that historical levels of human capital, legal origins, 
and geographically related variables are important in explaining institutions. In addition, controlling for 
the variables mentioned above,  all of the tested regressions suggest that historical levels of population 
density has no effect on shaping current institutions.
16
 
Our estimates of the first stage regressions contribute to the literature because the regression 
analysis is conducted using a recent dataset on institutional quality and a measure of human capital 
accumulation in the early 20
th
 century. Furthermore, the results discussed above are in accordance with 
previous findings in this field. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999)  find that French and Socialist legal 
origins have negative effects on the measures of governance, i.e., a property rights index, a business 
regulation index and a corruption index. Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), McArthur and Sachs (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) also find that geographically 
related variables affect current institutions. While we are able to replicate the findings of previous 
empirical examinations, this study adds a new finding that schooling density in the early 1900‟s also helps 
to explain current institutions. This finding is consistent with the reasoning of Lipset (1960), which argues 
that human capital accumulation contributes to shape more benign politics, less violence and more 
political stability. As noticed by Glaeser et al. (2004), “[t]he key human capital externality is not 
technological but political: courts and legislatures replace guns. These improvements in turn bring about 
greater security of property and economic growth.” (p. 282).  
 
4.2 Institutions and Innovation: IV Estimates 
Tables 5 through 8 report the regressions of the determinants of innovation using different 
measures of institutions and patent counts from both the USPTO and the World Bank. In these four tables, 
the dependent variable in models 1 thru 5 is the USPTO patent count between 1970 and 2003 and the 
dependent variable in models 6 thru 10 is the World Bank patent count between 1995 and 2001. Models 1, 
2, 6 and 7 only include variables suggested by the theoretical model. The other models are augmented to 
                                                 
16
 This was tested using both a linear and a quadratic specification for population density. In addition, there is a 
strong correlation between schooling density and population density, which suggests that a potential impact of 
agglomeration on institutions may have already been accounted for by including the schooling density variable. 
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evaluate the model‟s robustness. Models 1 and 6 are OLS estimates and all of the other models are IV 
estimates.  
The results show that the OLS estimates underestimate the impact of institutions on innovation. In 
all regressions the IV estimates of the coefficients on institutions are larger than the corresponding 
coefficients generated by OLS. This clearly indicates that there exists significant measurement error in the 
institutional variables, which is not accounted for in the OLS regressions, thus generating significant bias 
in the OLS estimates.
17
  
In all of the regressions the coefficients on personnel engaged in R&D and share of book 
production have the expected signs and are statistically significant.
18
 While these variables are not our key 
interest, they control for the size of an economy and the position of a country on the world knowledge 
frontier, allowing us to evaluate the net influences of institutions on patents production.
19
 It is important to 
emphasize that countries that are far from the technological frontier do not patent as much as the others. 
Therefore, failure to control for the distance from the technological frontier may bias the estimates of the 
impact of institutions on innovation. In this study the share of book production (and initial flow of patents) 
supposedly controls for a country's distance from the technological frontier (level of development).  
The results do not support the presence of scale effect from personnel engaged in R&D on patent 
production. In all of the regressions, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on personnel engaged in R&D 
is equal to one is rejected (at the 1% and 5% levels of significance) in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
that the coefficients are less than one. This implies that long-run growth of technology (patent production) 
                                                 
17
 This finding is consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
 
18
 In Table 7, models 7 through 10, the coefficients on book production are only marginally significant.  
 
19
 In a set of regressions not reported in the paper, we tested an alternative measure of book production. More 
precisely, we use the share of applied and pure science book production instead of the share of all new titles 
produced. There are no significant quantitative differences compared to those results reported in Tables 5-7, which 
corroborates the model‟s specification. However, the coefficient on applied and pure science book production is 
found to be positive but insignificant at the 5 % significance levels in the regressions for the Risk of Expropriation. 
The significance and sign of the other coefficients in these regressions are not affected.  In addition, the model‟s 
estimates using the initial flow of patents rather than the share of book production show no significant differences 
compared to the results reported in tables 5 through 8.  To save space, the results using the initial flow of patents are 
not reported.  
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cannot be sustained only with the increase of the workforce engaged in P&D. This finding contradicts the 
predictions from Romer (1990)‟s model, but is in accordance with the findings reported by Jones (1995).  
 The estimates provide evidence that, controlling for the size of an economy and the position of a 
country on the world knowledge frontier, institutions have a strong positive effect on innovation. 
Specifically, the coefficients on institutional measures are positive and statistically significant in all of the 
regressions reported in Tables 5 through 8. This suggests that economies that have market-friendly 
policies, lower perception of corruption, or whose judiciary systems are more effective and predictable 
will experience higher rates of innovation (patent production).  For example, the estimates suggest that if 
Brazil had the same market regulatory system as that of the U.S. (the difference in the regulatory quality 
index between these two countries is about 1.2), Brazilian residents would have produced about 2.5 times 
more patents than what they actually produced between 1970 and 2003. The model also suggests that 
controlling for the differences between the Brazilian and the U.S. indexes of control of corruption or rule 
of law, Brazilian patent production, between 1970 and 2003, would be approximately four times larger 
than it actually was. The presence of measurement errors in quantifying institutions implies that 
interpretation of the coefficients (marginal effects) of the model may be imprecise. However, the impacts 
of improving institutions on patent production seem to be quite large and have the right direction. 
It is worth noticing that the estimated size of the coefficients on institutions is larger than what 
was hypothesized by Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006). More specifically, the model developed by Tebaldi and 
Elmslie (2006) assumes that the coefficient on institutions should rage between 0 and 1, but our estimates 
provide evidence that the coefficient on institution is greater than one. This result may be generated due to 
the presence of measurement errors in quantifying institutions or imprecise model specification.    
The specification above implicitly assumes that adverse geography affects innovation through an 
indirect effect from institutions. This specification is similar to those used by Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 
2004) and Hall and Jones (1999). However, Gallup et al. (1999), Sachs (2000) and McArthur and Sachs 
(2001) argue that geography may have a direct effect on production as well as an indirect effect from 
institutions. The argument could be made that spatial location contributes directly to innovation. For 
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instance, mean temperature (climate) may affect the health of the personnel engaged in R&D
20
.  Models 3 
and 8 in Tables 5 through 8, report the estimates of the basic model augmented with mean temperature and 
the share of land in the coast. The regressions provide no support to the claim that geographically related 
variables have direct effects on innovation. Specifically, once we have controlled for institutions, the 
coefficients of mean temperature and share of land in the coast are insignificant at the standard levels of 
significance in all regressions.
21
  
 
4.3 Robustness 
Although the results detailed in the presentation seem reasonable, the estimates are subject to the 
validity of the IV estimates, which ultimately depends on the assumption that the model is properly 
identified by the set of proposed instruments. Of course, we recognize that the instruments are not perfect 
and that the exclusivity assumption may be violated. For instance, although initial human capital is 
expected to not be correlated with current innovation (patent production), there are channels (e.g. omitted 
variables, measurement error) by which initial human capital may be correlated with the error term of the 
second-stage regressions. To alleviate concerns about the validity of the instruments, we follow Acemoglu 
et al. (2005a) and Alcala and Ciccone (2004) and use the Hansen's J statistic (Hansen, 1982) to evaluate 
the overidentifying restrictions in the IV regressions. In general, the overidentification tests suggest that 
the correlation between the instruments proposed and the error term is not significant. The results give 
more confidence in the validity and robustness of the estimates. However, the test does cast some doubt 
that the model for risk of expropriation is correctly identified. 
The functional form chosen for the empirical model is also subject to imperfections, so alternative 
specifications can be used to check the robustness of the results. A key concern regarding the validity of 
the specification is motivated by the idea that countries that are far from the technological frontier do not 
patent as much as the others, independently from the quality of institutions. Another concern originates 
                                                 
20
 McArthur and Sachs (2001) refer to this effect as “disease ecology”.  
 
21
 In a set of regressions not reported, mean temperature was substituted for absolute latitude. The results are similar, 
that is, the coefficients of absolute latitude turned out to be insignificant in all regressions.  
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from the idea that developed and developing countries may respond differently to changes in institutional 
quality. We address these concerns by estimating three alternative models, whose estimates are shown in 
Table 9.  Models 1 and 3 test if innovation in OECD and non-OECD countries responds differently to the 
quality of institutions. The estimates show no differential effect for countries in the technological frontier 
(OECD) and countries far from the technological frontier (non-OECD countries). In addition, a quadratic 
model on institutions (Model 2) also shows no differential effect. These results suggest that the impact of 
institutional quality on innovation is important for countries in the technological frontier as well as for 
countries far from the technological frontier. This finding also refutes the idea that the link between 
institutions and patenting found in this study could be by showing a relationship between the level of 
development and a country's distance from the technological frontier.
22
  
 
5 Final Remarks  
 
Recently researchers have turned to study the impacts of institutions on economic performance. 
However, one can identify the following important gaps in the empirical institutional growth literature: i) 
the econometric specification used in institutions-related growth studies is not entirely supported by 
formal theoretical models; ii) the impact of institutions on technical innovation is overlooked in empirical 
investigations of cross-country economic performance; and iii) there is no clear empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that institutions affect an economy‟s steady state growth rate of per capita income. 
This study contributes to the literature by conducting an empirical examination on the links between 
innovation and institutions that addresses the points raised above.  
The estimates obtained show that institutional arrangements positively contribute to explain much 
of the variations on patent production across countries. Specifically, we find evidence that control of 
corruption, market-friendly policies, protection of property rights and a more effective judiciary system 
boost an economy‟s rate of innovation (patent production). 
                                                 
22
 We also tested if, controlling for institutional quality, the initial level of GDP per capita, a measure of economic 
development (and a measure of the distance from the technological frontier), affects innovation. The coefficients on 
initial level of GDP per capita turned out insignificant at the standard levels of confidence.  The authors would gladly 
provide these results upon request. 
 24 
While most of the previous literature on institutional and economic performance is able to show a 
positive association between institutions and levels of income and between institutions and the transitional 
growth rates of per capita income, an unambiguous empirical link between institutions and the steady state 
growth has not yet been established. Based on the theoretical model developed by Tebaldi and Elmslie 
(2006), which shows that the impacts of institutions on innovation spillover to the growth rate of GDP per 
capita, this paper shows evidence of a growth effect through innovation, i.e., institutions have a growth 
effect on income because institutional quality affects an economy‟s rate of innovation, the engine of 
economic growth.  
The econometric estimates also provide evidence that the impact of institutional quality on 
innovation is important for countries in the technological frontier as well as for countries far from the 
technological frontier. This result is important because it refutes the idea that countries that are far from 
the technological frontier do not patent as much as the others, independently from the quality of 
institutions. This research also finds that geography, per se, cannot explain differences in innovation 
across countries. Geography affects innovation, but only through institutions. This paper also provides 
empirical evidence that in the long-run human capital accumulation is an important variable in shaping 
institutions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Number 
of 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Control of Corruption 104
(1)
 0.038 1.082 
Rule of Law 110
(1)
 -0.003 1.064 
Regulatory Quality 109
(1)
 0.070 0.979 
Expropriation Risk 101
(1)
 6.976 1.881 
ln Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 110
(1)
 -1.481 3.159 
ln Population Density in the early 20th century (1,000 inhabitants) 106
(1)
 2.532 1.673 
Legal Origin - Socialist 110
(1)
 0.100 0.301 
Legal Origin - French 110
(1)
 0.545 0.500 
Legal Origin - German 110
(1)
 0.045 0.209 
Legal Origin - Scandinavian 110
(1)
 0.036 0.188 
Prop. land within 100km of the sea coast 110
(1)
 0.375 0.357 
Absolute Latitude 110
(1)
 0.268 0.184 
Mean Temperature 110
(1)
 20.075 7.331 
ln Patent Count, 1970-2003 - USPTO 76
(2)
 5.6060 3.4343 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D (average 1968-1972) 76
(2)
 8.5276 2.0099 
ln Share of book production, (average 1968-1972) 76
(2)
 -4.1496 1.9265 
ln Patent Count, 1995-2001-World Bank 55
(3)
 7.9426 3.1122 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D, (average 1995-2001) 55
(3)
 10.322 1.7942 
ln Share of book production(average 1995-1999) 55
(3)
 -2.4941 1.8325 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
 (1) Sample utilized in the analysis of the determinants of institutions, (2) sample used in the IV regressions with 
patent data from the USPTO; (3) sample utilized in the IV regressions with patent data from the World Bank. 
 
 
Table 2: Simple Correlation of Institutional Measures and Patent Count 
Institutional  
Measure 
Patent Count 1970-2003 
USPTO 
Patent Count, 1995-2001    
World Bank  
Regulatory Quality* 0.60 0.42 
Rule of Law* 0.68 0.58 
Control of Corruption* 0.69 0.56 
Risk of Expropriation** 0.80 0.76 
Source: Author‟s calculations; * number of countries=133;  ** number of countries =85 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of the Determinants of Institutions (Control of Corruption and Rule of Law) 
Explanatory Variables 
Control of Corruption Rule of law 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ln Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 0.044 0.033 0.090
a
 0.042 0.055
c
 0.060 0.094
 a
 0.050
c
 
  (1.33) (0.76) (2.90) (1.27) (1.89) (1.56) (3.60) (1.73) 
Legal Origin – Socialist -0.983
 a
 -0.997
 a
 -0.957
 a
 -0.950
 a
 -1.027
 a
 -1.003
 a
 -0.971
 a
 -0.991
 a
 
  (-4.37) (-4.15) (-4.26) (-4.21) (-4.53) (-4.15) (-4.39) (-4.35) 
Legal Origin – French -0.356
b
 -0.329
 b
 -0.351
 b
 -0.337
 b
 -0.387
a
 -0.376
a
 -0.380
a
 -0.371
a
 
  (-2.50) (-2.24) (-2.34) (-2.36) (-2.74) (-2.57) (-2.62) (-2.61) 
Legal Origin – German 0.089 0.056 0.326 0.086 0.277 0.303 0.473 0.275 
  (0.27) (0.16) (0.97) (0.26) (0.84) (0.87) (1.43) (0.83) 
Legal Origin – Scandinavian 0.221 0.202 0.677
 c
 0.263 0.031 0.019 0.407 0.069 
  (0.57) (0.51) (1.72) (0.67) (0.08) (0.05) (1.06) (0.18) 
Prop. land within 100 km of the sea coast 0.620
 a
 0.657
 a
 0.315 0.660
 a
 0.544
 b
 0.600
a
 0.265 0.601
 a
 
  (2.73) (2.75) (1.44) (2.90) (2.46) (2.57) (1.29) (2.73) 
Absolute Latitude 1.010 1.012 2.770
 a
   1.069
 c
 1.069
 c
 2.638
 a
   
  (1.61) (1.60) (6.35)   (1.72) (1.69) (6.54)   
Mean Temperature -0.071
 a
 -0.073
 a
   -0.093
 a
 -0.061
 a
 -0.061
 a
   -0.085
 a
 
  (-3.82) (-3.86)   (-7.54) (-3.32) (-3.26)   (-7.13) 
ln Population Density in the early 20th century   0.022       -0.017     
    (0.31)       (-0.25)     
Constant 1.244
 b
 1.349
 b
 -0.505
 b
 1.938
 a
 1.112
 b
 1.022
c
 -0.406
 b
 1.849
 a
 
  (2.47) (2.18) (-2.39) (7.37) (2.22) (1.70) (-2.10) (7.06) 
Sample size 104 104 104 104 110 106 110 110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.52 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.65 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-4 is control of corruption and the dependent variable in models 5-8 is Rule of Law; a, b and c denote that the 
coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with 
standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of the Determinants of Institutions (Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation) 
Explanatory Variables 
Regulatory Quality  Risk of Expropriation 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
ln Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 0.078
b
 0.080
c
 0.129
a
 0.082
 b
 0.164
 b
 0.147
 c
 0.272
 a
 0.165
 b
 
  (2.30) (1.73) (4.22) (2.41) (2.30) (1.60) (4.01) (2.31) 
Legal Origin – Socialist -0.853
 a
 -0.841
 a
 -0.724
 a
 -0.881
 a
 -1.064
 b
 -1.109
 b
 -0.713 -1.069
 b
 
  (-3.27) (-2.99) (-2.82) (-3.39) (-2.04) (-2.00) (-1.35) (-2.06) 
Legal Origin - French -0.097 -0.084 -0.116 -0.110 -0.562
 c
 -0.519
 c
 -0.555
 c
 -0.566
 c
 
  (-0.60) (-0.50) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-1.86) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.89) 
Legal Origin - German -0.091 -0.081 0.126 -0.090 0.262 0.181 0.679 0.264 
  (-0.24) (-0.20) (0.33) (-0.24) (0.38) (0.25) (0.95) (0.38) 
Legal Origin - Scandinavian -0.017 -0.025 0.406 -0.047 -0.251 -0.361 0.634 -0.259 
  (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.91) (-0.10) (-0.30) (-0.43) (0.76) (-0.32) 
Prop. land within 100 km of the sea coast 0.521
b
 0.558
b
 0.197 0.475
 c
 0.258 0.400 -0.429 0.251 
  (2.05) (2.07) (0.82) (1.89) (0.54) (0.80) (-0.92) (0.53) 
Absolute Latitude -0.839 -0.838 1.273
 c
   -0.200 -0.130 3.346   
  (-1.18) (-1.15) (2.68)   (-0.15) (-0.10) (3.60)   
Mean Temperature -0.078
 a
 -0.078
 a
   -0.059 -0.142
 a
 -0.148
 a
   -0.138
 a
 
  (-3.66) (-3.56)   (-4.25) (-3.60) (-3.68)   (-5.26) 
ln Population Density in the early 20th century   -0.006       0.028     
    (-0.08)       (0.19)     
Constant 1.928
 a
 1.890
 a
 -0.045 1.350
 a
 10.302
 a
 10.439
 a
 6.839
 a
 10.164
 a
 
  (3.34) (2.66) (-0.20) (4.47) (9.61) (7.96) (15.28) (18.19) 
Sample size 109 105 109 109 101 97 101 101 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.52 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 9-12 is Regulatory Quality and the dependent variable in models 13-16 is Risk of Expropriation; a, b and c denote that 
the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran 
with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5: IV Regressions of accumulated Patent Counts on Control of Corruption 
Explanatory Variables 
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001- World Bank 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Control of Corruption 1.53
 a
 1.79
 a
 2.16
 a
 1.78
 a
 1.79
 a
 0.85
 a
 1.06
 a
 1.21
 a
 1.03
 a
 0.99
 a
 
 (11.62) (9.45) (5.06) (9.70) (9.78) (5.57) (5.67) (3.33) (5.97) (5.86) 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D 0.49
 a
 0.49
 a
 0.51
 a
 0.49
 a
 0.49
 a
 0.68
 a
 0.69
 a
 0.68
 a
 0.68
 a
 0.68
 a
 
 (4.89) (5.19) (5.10) (5.20) (4.90) (4.59) (4.96) (5.25) (4.84) (4.86) 
ln Share of book production 0.55
 a
 0.46
 a
 0.44
 a
 0.46
 a
 0.46
 a
 0.67
 a
 0.60
 a
 0.56
 a
 0.61
 a
 0.63
 a
 
 (4.96) (4.23) (3.48) (4.15) (4.19) (4.17) (3.60) (3.62) (3.77) (3.58) 
Prop. land within 100 km of the sea coast - - -0.32 - - - - -0.87 - - 
 - - (-0.58) - - - - (-1.56) - - 
Mean Temperature - - 0.05 - - - - 0.01 - - 
 - - (1.06) - - - - (0.21) - - 
ln population (aged 15-64) density - - - 0.01 - - - - 0.04 - 
 - - - (0.09) - - - - (0.29) - 
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.000 - - - - -0.001 
 - - - - (0.07) - - - - (-0.20) 
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.000 - - - - 0.000 
 - - - - (-0.06) - - - - (0.38) 
Constant 3.29
 a
 2.78 1.61 2.75 2.76
b
 2.09 1.71 1.82 1.69 1.88 
 (2.69) (2.41) (1.01) (2.27) (2.34) (1.21) (1.01) (0.98) (0.97) (1.11) 
Method OLS IV IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV IV 
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Centered R-Squared 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
  
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) - 3.03 5.31 5.26 5.25 - 2.01 4.87 5.80 4.34 
[P-Value] - [0.22] [0.26] [0.26] [0.26] - [0.37] [0.30] [0.22] [0.36] 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is 
the natural logarithm of  the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% 
of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV 
regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: ln human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, 
mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast. 
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Table 6: IV Regressions of accumulated Patent Counts on Rule of Law 
Explanatory Variables 
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001- World Bank 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Rule of Law 1.64
 a
 1.91
 a
 2.17
 a
 1.92
 a
 1.94
 a
 0.99
 a
 1.16
 a
 1.19
 a
 1.14
 a
 1.13
 a
 
 (11.62) (10.36) (5.34) (10.52) (10.63) (5.82) (5.68) (3.72) (5.95) (5.84) 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D 0.41
 a
 0.40
 a
 0.41
 a
 0.40
 a
 0.41
 a
 0.67
 a
 0.68
 a
 0.67
 a
 0.68
 a
 0.68
 a
 
 (4.36) (4.45) (4.36) (4.38) (4.25) (4.59) (4.89) (5.10) (4.91) (4.88) 
ln Share of book production 0.60
 a
 0.52
 a
 0.52
 a
 0.53
 a
 0.52
 a
 0.65
 a
 0.59
 a
 0.55
 a
 0.60
 a
 0.61
 a
 
 (5.37) (4.55) (4.00) (4.52) (4.52) (3.94) (3.48) (3.54) (3.61) (3.42) 
Prop. land within 100 km of the sea coast - - -0.21 - - - - -0.74 - - 
 - - (-0.39) - - - - (-1.41) - - 
Mean Temperature - - 0.03 - - - - -0.01 - - 
 - - (0.75) - - - - (-0.25) - - 
ln population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.05 - - - - -0.04 - 
 - - - (-0.54) - - - - (-0.30) - 
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.00 
 - - - - (-0.45) - - - - (-0.33) 
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.00 
 - - - - (0.48) - - - - (0.30) 
Constant 4.02
 a
 3.67
 a
 3.01
 b
 3.87
 a
 3.65
 a
 2.01 1.74 2.11 1.83 1.79 
 (3.42) (3.19) (2.05) (3.20) (3.09) (1.16) (1.02) (1.20) (1.06) (1.05) 
Method OLS IV IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV IV 
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 55 55 55 55 55 
Centered R-Squared 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
  
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) - 2.76 4.06 4.23 4.30 - 0.96 3.54 4.17 3.20 
[P-Value] - [0.25] [0.40] [0.38] [0.37] - [0.62] [0.47] [0.38] [0.52] 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is 
the natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% 
of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV 
regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: ln human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, 
mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast. 
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Table 7: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts on Regulatory Quality 
Explanatory Variables 
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001- World Bank 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Regulatory Quality 1.61
a
 2.14
 a
 2.49
 a
 2.25
 a
 2.07
 a
 0.86
 a
 1.58
 a
 1.60
 a
 1.53
 a
 1.48
 a
 
 (6.65) (9.12) (3.56) (9.88) (8.98) (2.98) (5.25) (3.51) (5.65) (5.50) 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D 0.42
 a
 0.41
 a
 0.40
 a
 0.40
 a
 0.42
 a
 0.76
 a
 0.86
 a
 0.86
 a
 0.86
 a
 0.86
 a
 
 (3.73) (3.56) (3.32) (3.63) (3.62) (4.36) (5.22) (5.10) (5.18) (5.18) 
ln Share of book production 0.79
 a
 0.69
 a
 0.66
 a
 0.71
 a
 0.71
 a
 0.69
 a
 0.48
b
 0.43
b
 0.49
b
 0.52
b
 
 (6.46) (5.83) (5.11) (6.18) (6.03) (3.76) (2.22) (2.09) (2.41) (2.34) 
Prop. land within 100km of the sea coast - - -0.70 - - - - -0.80 - - 
 - - (-0.87) - - - - (-1.16) - - 
Mean Temperature - - 0.02 - - - - -0.02 - - 
 - - (0.26) - - - - (-0.50) - - 
ln population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.18 - - - - -0.03 - 
 - - - (-1.55) - - - - (-0.22) - 
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - -0.001 - - - - -0.004 
 - - - - (-0.32) - - - - (-0.58) 
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.0000 - - - - 0.0000 
 - - - - (0.38) - - - - (0.66) 
Constant 4.72
 a
 4.23
 a
 4.07
b
 4.86
 a
 4.26
 a
 1.29 -0.67 - - -0.34 
 (3.33) (2.92) (2.14) (3.26) (2.94) (0.60) (-0.33) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.17) 
Method OLS IV IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV IV 
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 55 55 55 55 55 
Centered R-Squared 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.80 
  
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) - 3.47 4.28 5.47 6.27 - 1.86 4.26 4.90 3.99 
[P-Value] - [0.18] [0.37] [0.24] [0.18] - [0.40] [0.37] [0.30] [0.41] 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is 
the natural logarithm of  the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% 
of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV 
regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: ln human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, 
mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast. 
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Table 8: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts on Expropriation Risk 
Explanatory Variables 
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001- World Bank 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Expropriation Risk 0.97
a
 1.45
 a
 1.42
 a
 1.45
 a
 1.45
 a
 0.69
 a
 1.07
 a
 1.30
 a
 1.02
 a
 0.98
 a
 
 (6.38) (7.43) (3.63) (7.56) (7.68) (5.03) (4.83) (3.10) (5.01) (5.17) 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D 0.31
 a
 0.24
b
 0.25
b
 0.24
b
 0.23
c
 0.58
 a
 0.54
 a
 0.50
b
 0.55
 a
 0.58
 a
 
 (2.86) (2.03) (2.32) (2.00) (1.87) (3.10) (2.81) (2.40) (2.91) (3.18) 
ln Share of book production 0.60
 a
 0.36
b
 0.39
b
 0.37
b
 0.35
b
 0.54
 b
 0.31 0.23 0.34 0.30 
 (4.31) (2.19) (2.14) (2.22) (2.15) (2.31) (1.35) (0.91) (1.54) (1.41) 
Prop. land within 100km of the sea coast - - 0.42 - - - - -0.85 - - 
 - - (0.68) - - - - (-1.39) - - 
Mean Temperature - - 0.01 - - - - 0.02 - - 
 - - (0.15) - - - - (0.55) - - 
ln population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.06 - - - - -0.04 - 
 - - - (-0.52) - - - - (-0.26) - 
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.00 - - - - -0.01
 b
 
 - - - - (0.25) - - - - (-2.37) 
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.0001
a
 
 - - - - (-0.23) - - - - (3.41) 
Constant -1.71 -5.63
 b
 -5.69 -5.45
 b
 -5.71
 b
 -2.14 -5.33
b
 -6.90 -4.81
c
 -4.71
b
 
 (-0.89) (-2.41) (-1.35) (-2.31) (-2.52) (-0.82) (-2.08) (-1.69) (-1.87) (-2.02) 
Method OLS IV IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV IV 
Sample Size 75 75 75 75 75 54 54 54 54 54 
Centered R-Squared 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.84 
 Overidentification Test 
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) - 8.94
c
 7.93
b
 9.67
b
 8.90
c
 - 2.86 0.40 3.72 4.49 
[P-value] - [0.06] [0.02] [0.05] [0.06] - [0.58] [0.82] [0.45] [0.34] 
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is 
the natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% 
of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV 
regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: ln human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, 
mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast. 
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Table 9: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts -USPTO 
Explanatory Variables 
T=Risk of Expropriation T=Regulatory Quality T=Control of Corruption T=Rule of Law 
Model 
 1 
Model 
 2 
Model  
3  
Model 
 4 
Model  
5 
Model  
6 
Model 
 7 
Model 
 8 
Model 
 9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model  
12 
Institution (T) 1.34
a
 2.11
c
 2.03
 a
 2.05
 a
 1.95
 a
 4.29
 a
 2.00
 a
 2.02
 a
 1.72
a
 2.03
a
 2.08
 a
 2.03
a
 
 (4.54) (1.82) (4.31) (5.59) (7.93) (4.11) (6.74) (5.39) (4.16) (6.53) (5.58) (4.03) 
Institution Squared (T^2) - -0.04 - - 0.80
b
 - - -0.16 -  -0.15 - 
 - (-0.57) - - (2.25) - - (-0.70) -  (-0.54) - 
OECD * Institution (T) 0.00 - - -0.18 - - -0.59 - - -0.43 - - 
 (-0.02) - - (-0.32) - - (-1.54) - - (-1.08) - - 
OECD 0.55 - - 0.70 - - 0.69 - - 0.63 - - 
 (0.25) - - (1.18) - - (1.28) - - (1.18) - - 
ln Personnel engaged in R&D 0.23
c
 0.22 0.88
 a
 0.39
 a
 0.56
 a
 1.37
 a
 0.50
 a
 0.49
 a
 0.98
a
 0.40
a
 0.39
 a
 1.01
a
 
 (1.80) (1.61) (2.88) (2.84) (4.05) (3.04) (4.07) (4.05) (2.72) (3.31) (3.14) (2.87) 
ln Share of book production 0.35
b
 0.37
b
 -0.03 0.65
 a
 0.48
 a
 -0.48 0.42
 a
 0.45
 a
 0.23 0.50
a
 0.53
 a
 0.01 
 (2.33) (2.44) (-0.07) (4.87) (3.47) (-0.80) (3.41) (3.59) (0.55) (4.05) (4.21) (0.03) 
Constant -5.03 -7.85 -18.61
 b
 4.09
b
 1.35 -10.81 2.55
c
 2.90
b
 -2.79 3.53
a
 3.92
 a
 -3.97 
 (-2.00)
b
 (-1.92)
c
 (-2.33) (2.51) (0.73) (-1.61) (1.77) (2.01) (-0.56) (2.46) (2.52) (-0.78) 
             
Method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Sample Size 75 75 
24 
(OECD) 
76 76 
24 
 (OECD) 
76 76 
24 
 (OECD) 
76 76 
24  
(OECD) 
Centered R-Squared 0.82 0.82 0,90 0.83 0.84 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of  the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are 
statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The IV regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: ln human capital density in the early 20th century, 
dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100km of the seacoast. For models 2, 5 ,8 and 11, the squared measure 
of institutions are instrumented by using the set of instruments listed above plus the squared values of the following variables: ln human capital density in the early 
20th century, mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast.  
 
  37 
Figure 1: Book Production and Initial Flow of Patents 
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Figure 2: Institutional Quality and Patent Production 
IRQ
MMR
NGA
CMR
KEN
SDN
TZA
IDN
LBY
ECU
PAKHND
GTMBOL
VNM
BGD
MWI
IRN
DZA
SYR
COL
SLV
PHL
GHA
DOM
CIV
BGR
ARG
ROM
LBN
MEX
PAJAM
MDG
IND
THA
CUB
LKA
EGY
TUR
PER
BRA
JOR
SAU
TUN
KOR
MUS
POL
MYS
URY
GRC
HUN
ITA
CRI
JPN
ISRBEL
ESP
PRTCHL
FRA
IRL
USA
AUT
DEU
AUS
GBR
NOR
CANCHE
NLD
NZL
DNK
SWE
SGP
FIN
0
5
1
0
1
5
ln
 P
a
te
n
ts
 g
ra
n
te
d
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
3
- 
U
S
P
T
O
-1 0 1 2 3
Control of Corruption'
bandwidth = .8
 
IRQ
SDNMMR
NGA
CMR
LBY
KEN
HND
IDN
GTM
CIV
BGD
CUB
DZAMDG
COL
PAK
VNM
ECU
IRNBOL
PER
TZA
SLV
MWI
SYR
DOM
PHL
MEX
JAM
ROM
BRA
GHA
LBN
BGR
ARG
PAN
LKA
TUR
IND
EGY
TUN
THA
JOR
URY
POL
SAU
MYSGRC
CRI
KOR
HUN
MUS
ITA
ISR
ESP
PRTCHL
FRA
BEL
JPN
IRL
USA
DEU
CAN
GBR
AUS
NLDSWE
DNK
AUT
NZLSGP
FIN
NOR
CHE
0
5
1
0
1
5
ln
 P
a
te
n
ts
 g
ra
n
te
d
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
3
- 
U
S
P
T
O
-2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law'
bandwidth = .8
 
IRQ
LBY
IRN
MMRSDN
CUB
SYR
DZA
NGA
VNM
PAK
BGDCMR
KEN
MDG
IDN
TZA
IND
ECU
MWICIV
EGY
ROM
SAU
GHA
HND
LBN
DOM
COL
BRA
TUN
ARG
BGR
GTM
JOR
PHL
LKA
TUR
THA
MUS
JAMBOL
KOR
MYS
PER
MEX
POL
JPN
SLV
CRI
PANURY
ITA
GRC
ISR
HUN
FRA
BEL
ESP
PRT
NOR
CAN
CHL
SWE
DEU
CHE
AUSAUT
USA
DNK
IRLNZL
FIN
GBR
NLD
SGP
0
5
1
0
1
5
ln
 P
a
te
n
ts
 g
ra
n
te
d
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
3
- 
U
S
P
T
O
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Regulatory Quality'
bandwidth = .8
 
IRQ
SDNMDG
IRN
SLV
GTMLBN
BGD
LBY
HND
PHL
NGABOL
SYR
MMR
PAN
PER
PAKLKA
KENDOM
GHA
CMR
TUN
ARG
DZA
ECU
VNMTZA
JOR
EGY
MWI
CRI
CIV
CUB
JAMURY
ROM
COLTUR
MEX
IDN
SAUTHA
POL
GRC
CHL
BRA
MYS
IND
ISR
KOR
BGR
HUN
PRT
AUS
SGP
ITASWE
ESP
BEL
IRL
CAN
FIN
NZL
JPN
AUT
DNK
FRAGBR
NOR
DEU
CHE
USA
NLD
0
5
1
0
1
5
ln
 P
a
te
n
ts
 g
ra
n
te
d
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
3
- 
U
S
P
T
O
2 4 6 8 10
Risk of Expropriation
bandwidth = .8
 
